In a statement issued in Arabic, the group, which refers to itself by an Arabic name that loosely translates as the "Free Sadr Brigades in All Iraq," rejects the orders of Muqtada al-Sadr to freeze militia activity, saying that such a decree is not within his powers, and claiming that their organization is not covered by the recent declaration.
The Brigades also reportedly lob several allegations at Iranian interference in the country, focusing on the special protection forces of the Shi'a holy sites, and defend the rights of Iraqis to bear arms, and decry recent fighting in Karbala, suggesting that the deadly clashes were part of a planned conspiracy on the part of pro-Iranian forces.
The group's name refers to Muqtada al-Sadr's father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the late high-ranking cleric, from whom Muqtada's authority in the Sadrist Current is derived.
"While we value the role of his excellency Muqtada al-Sadr in burying (sectarian) divisions and forbidding strife" among Iraqis, the young Shi'a cleric does not enjoy the authority to order the Mahdi Army to "freeze" its activity, the group reportedly writes. If anything, the statement continues, this is among the competencies of the highest-level Shi'a clerics (marja'iya).
The statement declares: "We announce that the 'Free Sadr Brigades in All Iraq' are not included in this ("freeze") decree, and that they will continue to practice the role that all divine, international, and humanitarian laws have guaranteed for them, until Iraq is again a free country, rid of all manifestations of oppression, domination, (foreign) tutelage and treachery."
Shrine Protection Forces Accused
The statement draws a parallel between recent fighting in Karbala and events of 16 years ago -- when the Ba'thist regime ruthlessly put down a revolt in the Iraqi south after the 1991 US-Iraq war, suggesting that those security forces and shrine protection forces who fought against the suspected Mahdi Army elements in Karbala, leading to the death of 52 Iraqis, many of them unarmed pilgrims, are behaving as the Ba'thist regime did against the Shi'a rebels.
In Karbala, the many dead and arrested prove that "this was not a spontaneous development, or transient confusion, but that the crime was planned" in advance, the statement adds.
The group's statement also includes a long series of accusations against the official protection service of the Shi'a shrines in Iraq, which it described as a "suspicious" organization, under the direction of the intelligence of a neighboring country, without reference to any (Iraqi) governmental organs," a condition which, the statement says, the Iraqi government knows very well.
The shrine protection services, which were involved in the recent fighting in Karbala, are distinct from the official Iraqi security forces and report to the Shi'a clerical hierarchy in Karbala and Najaf, not to the national or provincial governments.
The statement accuses the shrine protection force of employing 3,000 Iranian fighters in Karbala alone, and of stockpiling weapons from Iran in Karbala, shipped in large boxes marked: "Forbidden to open. Gifts and tools for the construction of the shrines of Husayn and Abbas."
The group also alleges that the shrine force works against Iraqi nationalists in the service of Iranian interests, in wasy such as gathering information about Iraqi pilots who fought in the Iran-Iraq war and "eliminating them," as well as "exploiting (the Shi'a holy sites) against the nationalist elements such as the Sadrists, the Sarkhioun and the Fudhula', or even (against) those whose remarks they do not like," referring to an alleged incident earlier in the year when, according to the statement, Prime Minister Maliki was cut off from speaking by the guards of a holy site when he reportedly called for the dissolution of Iranian-funded militias. (The Sarkhioun and the Fudhula' refer to the followers of the Shi'a clerics Mahmoud al-Hasany al-Sarkhi, and Muhammad al-Ya'qoubi, respectively. Both broke away from the Sadrist Current after the death of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr's father, in 1999. Ya'qoubi is considered the spiritual leader of the Fadhila Party.)
The statement also refers to many attempts to "explode the situation" in Karbala by "raising the spirit of sectarian strife" by placing IEDs and car bombs, and refers to an alleged incident in May when the Iraqi government allegedly experienced pressure to cover up an alleged shipment of five Iranian Shihab-1 missiles to Karbala. Such activities are also blamed on the allegedly Iranian-backed protection service of the Shi'a shrines, according to the statement. The group also accuses the shrine protection authorities of involvement in the recent assassinations of the two governors of Muthanna and Qadisiya provinces, and in directing accusations of these crimes at the Sadrist current. The statement does not present any evidence this charge against the shrine forces, al-Malaf Press writes.
Finally, the statement calls for the "immediate intervention" of the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and human rights organizations, calling for the formation of investigative committee to "uncover the real criminals, and to liberate the holy shrines from these criminal militias and to search the shrines (that have been) violated by various sorts of weapons."
The new group is all but unheard of on the Iraqi scene, although al-Malaf Press reports that the mysterious brigades surfaced in southern Iraq earlier in August, after the assassination of the governor of Qadisiya Province, with a statement threatening the governor of neighboring Dhi Qar province -- also affiliated with the SIIC -- with the same fate. After the assassination of the governor of Muthanna province, al-Malaf Press writes, the group issued another statement to similar effect.
The import and provenance of the statement cannot be verified at this time, nor can the identity or strength of the group purported to have issued it. It is not known, for example, if the self-styled "Brigades" are behind any of the reported violent acts reported in Iraq in defiance of Muqtada al-Sadr's "freeze" orders to the Mahdi Army.
Taking the text at face value, however, the statement may be interpreted as many things: A first salvo in a struggle to come over the future of the Mahdi Army in Iraq, an insight into the intrigue below the surface of the Iraqi Shi'a community, a sampling of nationalist Shi'a resentment of Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs, and an echo of an earlier phase in the history of the Sadrist current, before Muqtada al-Sadr assumed his place of authority leadership of his father's movement.
It bears noting that before his death in 1999 at the hand of an unknown hit squad -- believed by his followers to be sent by the Ba'thist regime -- Muhammad al-Sadr did not nominate his young son Muqtada to succeed him, but rather chose a high-ranking cleric, Ayatollah Kadhim Al-Hai’ri, who was living in exile in Iran. Muqtada has since assumed leadership of the movement, but was not at that time an obvious candidate to lead the Sadrist current.
Although Muqtada al-Sadr is considered one of the most powerful men in Iraq, and he enjoys widespread support among the popular classes of Iraqi Shi'a, the statement published today -- if true -- demonstrates that his authority over his late father's devotees may not be beyond reproach, and that at least some self-styled elements of the Sadrist Current may be willing to challenge Muqtada -- in his father's name.
