The newspaper added, quoting sources in the Iraqi Army, that the victims were local Sunni leaders, and were in Taji in order to hold meetings with local Shi'a tribal chiefs, under the protection of the US Army. The organization responsible for the assassination has not yet been revealed, but the operation carries the stamp of al-Qa'ida and its affiliated groups.
Pro-government and pro-US tribal leaders have been a prime target for al-Qa'ida, especially with the formation of tribal alliances and militias that have participated in the fight against the extremist organization and its “Islamic State of Iraq;” primarily in Anbar and Diyali.
Meanwhile in Najaf, assassins were able to infiltrate the security zone around the highest Shi'a authority in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, and kill one of his aides in his home, a mere 50 meters from Sistani’s residence.
Al-Hayat said that Sheikh 'Abdallah Falk, charged with the financial management of Sistani’s foundations, was stabbed to death in his home by “unidentified individuals.” The assassination created a tense atmosphere in the city, the paper added, and caused the closure of the old city. Falk was assassinated in the Rasul street in Najaf, steps away from the shrine of 'Ali bin Abi Talib, and the offices of Sistani. The assassination stirred questions in the city, al-Hayat claimed, regarding the identity and motives of the killers.
The area of the attack is under tight security control, al-Hayat’s correspondent said, and is completely cordoned off and enclosed within metal gates, equipped with metal and explosive detectors. The attack is rendered even more suspicious by the fact that it is the last in a series of assassinations targeting Sistani’s aides and representatives in the Southern provinces of Iraq.
This comes as al-Quds al-'Arabi (which follows an Arab Nationalist line, and was one of the few media outlets supportive of Saddam in the 1990s) reported harsh criticisms by Sistani against Maliki. The London-based paper led the report with the explosive –and exaggerated- headline “Sistani boycotts Maliki’s government.” The paper quoted “sources close to Sistani” as saying that the Shi'a cleric has demanded that his representatives cut their ties with government officials “in protest over its policies.”
The newspaper also quoted Friday sermons by clerics close to Sistani, in which fierce attacks were directed at the government and its inefficiencies. A Sistani representative in Karbala described the government institutions as “dictatorships,” and described its officials as “the inheritors (of Saddam’s regime).”
In other news, the Iraqi national soccer team beat Vietnam and qualified for the semi-final game of the Asia Cup, in a game dominated by Iraq from start to finish.
Many Western media sources are adding a romantic flair to Iraq’s soccer victories, and presenting the team as a microcosm of the “Iraq to be” or the “Iraq that was,” pointing out that the national team contains players “from all sects and ethnicities.”
Such a view persists in conceptualizing Iraq as a mere collection of sects, a perspective that has governed the American engagement in Iraq since the days of Paul Bremer; and ignores that the current mood of sectarian agitation is quite recent in the history of the country. While sectarianism was often present (in various ways) in Iraqi politics and society, it was not always the prime determinant of the individual identity, a large section of Iraqis led social and political lives that were not primarily centered around their sectarian identity. The impressive Iraqi soccer team is a case in point.
Most of the players that beat Vietnam yesterday were the product of the - efficient - Iraqi sports academes in the 1980s and the 1990s. Many of the players of the current national selection also played together in the Iraqi Olympic team that dazzled the world in Athena’s Olympiad in 2004, when the country that had just emerged from a devastating war came extremely close to winning a medal. The Iraqi players in the Asian Cup also played together in Iraq’s major clubs: the Air Force, Zawra’ and Talaba, among others, and many of them migrated together starting in the 1990s, when the economic conditions in the country became dire, playing in several Middle Eastern and European clubs.
Iraqi soccer has an interesting political history, like many countries that underwent British colonialism; soccer became quickly popular in Iraq since the early 20th century. The state exploited the Iraqi passion for the sport in various ways. In the 1980s, especially during the war with Iran, the Iraqi state used international competitions to boost national pride and present –abroad and at home- an image of a “victorious Iraq.” The state spent lavishly on sports complexes, politicians and officials sponsored clubs, watched closely the results of the national team, rewarded performing players, and found inventive ways to punish them in case of a defeat.
While the Iraqi and Western media are pouring flattery and good-wishes upon the national team. Many ignore the fact that this may be the last Iraqi team to compete seriously on the international scene for some time. While Iraq is achieving victories in Asia, the soccer federation in the country is in disarray and fraught with divisions, the league cannot be held under the current security conditions, and was replaced with a mini-competition held exclusively in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Iraqi youth today are receiving a mere fraction of the resources and training that was available to their older peers.
