Az-Zaman said that these decisions were part of a “new program” for the party that was announced during a two-day general conference (in which the party’s current leader, 'Abd al-'Azeez al-Hakeem was re-elected for a new mandate).
SCIRI officials discussed aspects of these radical reforms with the press, even though the resolutions of the conference will not be publicly disclosed until Saturday.
The scope and details of the SCIRI reforms remain unclear. While a party official told Reuters that the changes are intended to “Iraqify” the party, by making Ayatollah Sistani –- who resides in Najaf -- its new spiritual authority, a rupture with Khamena'i and the Iranian-inspired Islamic Revolution would signify an enormous shift in the party’s ideology.
SCIRI is one of the most popular Shi'a parties in Iraq. It was founded in Iran by Shi'a Iraqi dissidents in the early 1980s and took its inspiration from the Khomeinist revolution in Iran in 1979. As is well known, the Iranian revolution did not perceive itself as a localized movement in Iran, but as a beginning of an internationalist revolt that would eventually involve all of the “disinherited” of the earth in an uprising against tyranny and injustice.
In that sense, SCIRI – as the party’s name indicates – saw itself as the “Iraqi branch” of the Khomeinist movement. Al-Hayat said that a statement by the party announced that SCIRI will change its name, and remove the term “revolution” because “it signified combating Saddam Husain.” That argument is patently incorrect, since the party’s literature and history clearly indicate that it did not perceive itself as a mere movement of contestation against the defunct dictator, but as an extension to Khomeini’s revolutionary vision.
The most important question, however, centers on SCIRI’s relationship with Iran and Khamena’i after the passing of the reforms, and the party’s stance towards the model of Wilayat al-Faqeeh (literally meaning "the Rule of the Jurist").
To simplify to the extreme, Wilayat al-Faqeeh is a concept that was introduced by Ayatollah Ruhullah al-Khomeini, and advocates the founding of a “supreme” authority among Shi'a clerics, one that would combine both religious and political powers. The Faqeeh would -– in effect –- carry the authority of the Imam (in this case, the Mahdi) and act as his representative on earth until his foreseen return.
(Editor's note: In the Shi'a tradition, the Imam is God's appointed ruler of the community. Most Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a trace a blood line of 12 Imams beginning with Ali, the cousin of the prophet Muhammad, through the Imam al-Mahdi, who disappeared in the 9th Century without a successor. Much of Shi'a political thought has concerned the proper leadership of the community in the absence of the Mahdi while his return is awaited.)
Shi'a Islam had relied, historically, on a de-centralized clerical establishment, whereby several scholars rise simultaneously to the rank of marja' (religious authority) and may disagree over religious and temporal rulings; it is left to the Shi'a individual to choose a specific marja' to follow.
Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqeeh –- which enshrined Khomeini, and then Khamena’i, as a supreme authority - represented a formidable challenge to traditional Shi'ism. While tens of millions of Shi'as accepted the theory of Wilayat al-Faqeeh, many others differed and considered Khomeini’s vision to have no precedent or legitimation in Shi'a theology.
For Khamena’i’s followers, however, the fulfillment of the Supreme Ayatollah’s edicts, whether they relate to religious matters or temporal ones, is equivalent to a religious duty (Takleef Shar'i); in other terms, these rulings have the same power of an order issued by the Imam himself. (Nevertheless, even in the Iranian system the Faqeeh's powers have been subject to varying interpretations by the successive elected presidents of the Islamic Republic.)
If SCIRI does intend to abandon the umbrella of Khamena’i and replace him with Sistani, as the Reuters report insinuated, that would indicate a dramatic shift in the party’s structure and beliefs. If that were the case, it remains to be seen how the rank and file of SCIRI will react to the event, and whether they will follow their local leader, 'Abd al-'Azeez al-Hakeem, or their supreme religious authority, Ayatollah al-Khamena’i.
It is doubtful, however, that Hakeem would go against the will of Khamena’i, which would have dramatic implications on Hakeem’s following, but we still know very little about the details of the new arrangement and the position of the Supreme Ayatollah in the “neo-SCIRI” ideology (note: Sistani rejects the “Khomeinist” expanded concept of Wilayat al-Faqeeh).
Az-Zaman claimed that SCIRI’s move is motivated by purely pragmatic concerns. The newspaper said that the reforms were designed to prop up the party before the next elections, and to avoid further fragmentation within the Shi'a ruling coalition.
In any case, Sistani has little in common with Khamena'i. While the Iranian leader is known to be vocal and extremely politicized, Sistani spent most of his life as a recluse scholar, and, as Reuters indicated, publishes rare and disparate public statements. Sistani’s lack of interest in political matters often drew criticism from activist Shi'a, especially the Sadrists, who make a distinction between a “vocal” clerical establishment (in reference to Sadr and his father) and a “silent” one, an implicit commentary on Sistani’s political postures.
