Az-Zaman (international) headlined with: “Militias resume the activities of sectarian death squads.” The newspaper report indicated that “the militias affiliated with political parties participating in the government,” (a long way of referring to the main Shi'a militias, especially the Badr organization and the Mahdi Army) “are reappearing in Baghdad.”
Az-Zaman claimed, quoting “eye-witnesses,” that these militias have resumed practices of blocking roads and bridges and kidnapping citizens. Furthermore, Az-Zaman noted that these practices are often done publicly, “right in front of police patrols,” in a throwback to the ‘pre-Baghdad Plan’ era. The newspaper remarked, however, that “the activity of the militias is concentrated outside of Sadr City;” in a possible hint that the organization(s) referred to by Az-Zaman is not the Mahdi Army.
It is hard to determine the veracity and the generalizability of the Az-Zaman report (keeping in mind the political inklings of the publication;) it is also too early to assume that these events, if true, signify the failure of the Baghdad Security Plan (or Operation “Imposing Order,” to use the official Iraqi appellation;) but this story comes along with multiple reports indicating a sharp rise in sectarian violence and suicide bombings in Iraq.
The rise in violence was especially acute in Northern Iraq, perhaps as a backlash to the events of Tal 'Afar last week. Kirkuk, Mosul and Baghdad witnessed several suicide bombings against police and civilian targets, and discarded bodies are starting to appear at frightening rates in Iraqi cities, Az-Zaman dubbed yesterday “a day for the collection of bodies.”
The events of Tal 'Afar have clearly strained sectarian politics in Iraq. As-Sabah al-Jadeed said that over 100 homes were destroyed in the suicide bombings that hit the city on Tuesday. As-Sabah al-Jadeed also revealed new details on the massacre that occurred after the bombings, with the possible participation of police elements, according to the newspaper “armed militias, accompanied by policemen in the their civilian clothing, raided the homes of residents at night, led them out of their homes ... and executed them.”
Pan-Arab al-Hayat also focused on the difficulties facing the Baghdad Security Plan. According to the London-based newspaper, the entrances of Baghdad remain the hardest obstacle for the units charged with imposing government control over the capital.
The city entrances, located at the outskirts of the capital, have become a magnet for armed groups fleeing Baghdad proper. The topography of theses areas and their demographic composition seem to be ideal for insurgent activities: the towns on Baghdad’s outskirts tend to be rural, with a lot of spaces to hide in the orchards and plantations, and they are generally mixed in terms of sectarian and ethnic composition.
Add to that the strategic importance of these areas, as they control traffic movement in and out of Baghdad. Al-Hayat said that all attempts over the last years to cleanse these towns from armed presence have been futile. The newspaper quoted an official in the ministry of defense who said that “the inability of Iraqi security forces to impose their control over Baghdad ... is due to the persistence of security challenges in Baghdad’s outskirts.”
Lastly, Az-Zaman (Iraq edition) claimed that Iyad 'Allawi is on his way to becoming the next prime minister of Iraq, in a move that will restructure the web of alliances in the Iraqi parliament.
Such reports have been abundant since 'Allawi launched the “Iraqi National Front,” in a merger between his parliamentary bloc and the main Sunni bloc in the Iraqi National Assembly. 'Allawi said that more parties will join his new “front” that aims at replacing sectarian coalitions in Iraq with “national” ones.
Az-Zaman said that 'Allawi has gained the approval of Anbari tribes (no doubt with the help of his Sunni ally, 'Adnan al-Dulaimi) and introduced new independent parties into his political coalition. The newspaper said that 'Allawi is still negotiating with the Shi'a Al-Fadhila party and will propose an alliance with the Kurdish parties (which control a sizeable portion of the Iraqi parliament.) If these plans come through, 'Allawi will have (mathematically) a veritable chance to form a new government cabinet. However, 'Allawi’s talks with the Kurdish parties, the deciding factor in terms of who controls the parliament’s majority have been unfruitful so far, with the Kurdish leaders insisting on their alliance with the Shi'a coalition headed by 'Abd al-'Azeez al-Hakeem.
What is more interesting in Az-Zaman’s lead story is the fact that the Iraqi Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashimi, is attempting to construct a new coalition, similar to 'Allawi’s in several ways and carrying a comparable “anti-sectarian” agenda. Az-Zaman said that al-Hashimi has also entered talks with the Fadhila party and that he is engaged in a race with 'Allawi to gather allies for a bid for the Prime Ministership.
