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A Closer Look at the Iraq Natl. Intel. Estima
Negative Current Assessment, Future Outlook Even More Bleak
02/02/2007 12:52 PM ET
The declassified versions of the National Intelligence Council estimates are usually scrubbed of all the most provocative key judgments, and this one seems no different. It will take a few more weeks for a member of Congress to leak word of the most damning conclusions to a journalist or blogger (hint, hint).

Even so, the just-released NIE makes it clear that things are not going well in Iraq, and they are not likely to get any better in the near future.

Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.

The bulk of the estimate tells us things we already know--that the Shia were repressed under Saddam and are now suspicious of Sunni power, that the Sunnis don't like their newly-discovered minority status, that Kurds will not give up their autonomy--but there are a few interesting nuggets.

In support of an enduring American presence in Iraq:

If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict.

However, Iraqis don't need help from Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia; they're capable of wreaking mass devastation all by themselves:

Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics.

This isn't a civil war, it's much, much worse:

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

See here for a .pdf of the complete declassified version. nie_iraq.pdf

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